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Dignified Death And The Law Of Torts*
WILLARD H. PEDRICK**
When Don Weckstein invited me to deliver the 1990 Nathanial L.
Nathanson Memorial Lecture at the University of San Diego Law
School, I accepted almost before he got the invitation out of his
mouth. When I was a first year law student at Northwestern Univer-
sity Law School, Nat was a first year professor. Since he was then
junior to the entire faculty, he was assigned the non-enviable task of
teaching the Law of Agency. With Nat as our professor, we learned
about "frolic and detour" and a lot more as well. He was a great
teacher and a great scholar. I must read the last paragraph of my
tribute to Nat in the San Diego Law Review:
There is a tale of the unlettered farmer who was asked whether he had seen
* These remarks were delivered on March 30, 1990 as the Nathaniel Nathanson
Memorial Lecture for 1990 at the University of San Diego Law School and are
published here with minor revisions. The usual academic ornamentation by way of
footnotes have been added to enable interested persons to find the sources which were
referred to in the lecture.
After delivery of the Nathanson Memorial Lecture on March 30, 1990, the long
awaited decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't
of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990), was decided on June 25, 1990. The Court, majority
and dissenters, recognized the right of the patient in extremis to refuse medical
treatment as a "liberty interest" protected by the fourteenth amendment. But for the
unconscious patient in a persistent vegetative state, as was Nancy Cruzan, the Court
majority held that any previous instructions or directions given by the now unconscious
patient would have to be established by evidence satisfactory to the state court. The
Missouri Supreme Court had adopted a "clear and convincing" standard of proof and
had found that the evidence in the Cruzan case did not meet that standard.
Consequently, the case had not been made for disconnection of life support systems. The
United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Missouri Court. Thus, it is left
to the states to determine whether the patient, now unconscious, has authoritatively
directed non-use of life support systems in the particular situation. The Cruzan decision
is relevant to the present paper only in recognizing the doctrine of patient autonomy as
an element of "liberty" protected by the fourteenth amendment.
** Professor Emeritus, Arizona State University College of Law, Founding Dean,
Arizona State University College of Law, and for twenty years a colleague of Professor
Nathanial L. Nathanson at the Northwestern University School of Law.
a display two nights earlier of shooting stars. He replied that he had missed
the event, but noticed the following night that the stars 'seemed to have
thinned out a bit.' When Nat Nathanson left us, the stars did not thin out,
for the general radiance of the spirit of this great man was passed on to us,
to all of us. It will continue to glow and will sustain, through our work and
through time, the very enlightenment this warm, lively, witty, unassuming,
resolute and wonderful man gave to us.'
So, I am honored, indeed, to give the Nathanson Memorial Lecture
this year.
A word about the title to these remarks. Generally speaking, my
titles are more highly regarded than my speeches themselves. My
favorite title in all of legal literature, not mine, appeared years ago
in the Indiana Law Journal. The title belonged to a Note on the
subject of voyeurism entitled, "Peeping Toms and Other Men of Vi-
sion." But this afternoon's title is not very exciting---deliberately so.
It seemed political in this setting to make clear that I am not speak-
ing about Roe v. Wade. It is rather the other end of life that I am
addressing; hence the title, "Dignified Death and the Law of Torts."
How did I get interested in this topic? Well, I have been a Torts
teacher and scholar for a very long time, and perhaps it is simply my
age that disposes me to think about the end of life and circumstances
surrounding it. Along with many of you, I can remember in 1976
when the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the family of
Karen Ann Quinlan was entitled to have her disconnected from the
respirator that had sustained her vital signs though there was no real
hope for her recovery to a meaningful existence.2 Pursuant to the
court order, they did disconnect, but it was another nine years of
unconscious existence before Karen Ann finally succumbed. 3
I have seen estimates ranging from 5,000 to 50,000 as the number
of persons in a permanent vegetative state, who are presently sus-
tained in what is classed as "life." These people are sustained by life
support systems, principally respiratory mechanisms and tubes in-
serted into the patient's body for nutrition and hydration.4
A case very recently decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States involved Nancy Cruzan, a young woman in Missouri who was
brain damaged in an automobile crash and has been sustained in a
vegetative state for seven years. Her life was being sustained by
1. Pedrick, My Professor, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 433, 435 (1985).
2. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
3. M. HALL AND I. ELLMAN, HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS IN A NUTSHELL 284
(1989).
4. Miller, Right to Die, Damage Actions: Developments in the Law, 65 DEN. U.L.
REv. 181, 182 (1988). See also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, I10 S. Ct.
2841 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in
Cruzan states: "As many as 10,000 patients are being maintained in persistent vegetative
states in the United States, and the numbers are expected to increase significantly in the
near future." Id. at 2877 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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nasogastric tubes for nutrition and hydration, with an expectancy
that this would continue for thirty more years.5 Why the Supreme
Court of the United States saw fit to grant certiorari in the case is a
bit of a mystery. It is true, of course, that Missouri, as the "show
me" state, declined to allow removal of the nasogastric tube on the
family's request, contrary to an almost solid line of authority in all
the other states passing on the question, which uphold the right of
the patient, or one representing the patient, to decide whether or not
to continue life support systems when the situation is hopeless.6
It is true also that the lawyer for the family in the Nancy Cruzan
case argued for the right to disconnect under a "right of privacy"
theory which a number of the state courts, including California, have
embraced. But the common law of torts makes the individual captain
not only of the soul, but of the body as well - at least in situations
where the prospects for recovery are hopeless and the question is
whether the patient or someone on his or her behalf can order dis-
connection of a life support system. Certainly those of us who are
interested in the subject had misgivings about the Supreme Court of
the United States federalizing this area of tort law when the states,
Missouri excepted, have been reaching quite satisfactory results
under either state privacy rights or better still, the common law. In
Missouri, a bill was introduced in the state legislature this year, sup-
ported by Attorney General Webster, to allow disconnection after
three years. Perhaps compassion will ultimately come to Missouri.
In the Nancy Cruzan case, the Supreme Court devised a method
for slightly avoiding the issue, a not uncommon outcome. The Court
held that Nancy Cruzan's right to refuse medical treatment was hers
alone, absent any state procedure for assertion of her rights by an-
other. Thus, it was constitutionally permissible for Missouri to re-
quire "clear and convincing" evidence of Nancy's intentions.'
The Cruzans, incidentally, have been members of the Society for
the Right to Die for some years, and in a letter to the New York
Office of the Society, Nancy's father said in part,
Because of our love for her, after this period of time in which she has shown
no improvement [now seven years], we feel the most humane and kind thing
5. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2845.
6. See id. at 2888 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 2852-55. That, in fact, was the ground of the decision in the Cruzan case.
But the Court went to some lengths to disavow the right of privacy as the ground for the
constitutional protection of patient autonomy. Instead, the Court preferred to put the
constitutional protection of the right to control one's body as a right of "liberty" under
the fourteenth amendment. See id.
we can do is to help her escape this "limbo" between life and death that she
is caught in by terminating her life. . .she would not have wanted to live
like this and. . .our feelings are for her sake and not for ours.8
But to come back to the announced title, my law teaching career
has been involved heavily in the fields of Estate Planning and Torts.
The subject of the right to a dignified death and tort law is where
the two fields intersect.
Another word or two by way of background: There is general pop-
ular concern about the overuse of life sustaining apparatus when
there is no prospect of recovery. These technical achievements are
viewed with great revulsion on the part of most people. Your chance,
when dying, of being hooked to a life sustaining system is, at most,
but one in twenty, and maybe only one in forty." But, polls indicate
that now more than 80 % of those queried think the patient or an
agent should have the right to refuse use of life support systems
when there is no hope of recovery. 10
In 1976, California was the first state to enact a so-called "living
will" statute." That is a singularly inappropriate term for a statute
that authorizes the individual, under certain circumstances, to direct
that life sustaining apparatus is not to be employed to preserve an
expiring life. I will have a bit more to say about the California stat-
ute later, but California was th6 first of some now forty states to
enact legislation on this subject. More than a dozen states, including
California, have also enacted special legislation authorizing execu-
tion of a durable power of attorney naming an agent to make health
care decisions when the principal cannot.
It is my thesis here today, and in my recent article on Arizona
law,12 that familiar principles of tort law can be enlisted to better
assure that unwanted life support measures either will not be used,
or will be withdrawn when that is the wish of the patient or the
patient's agent. I propose to develop my thesis by considering a hy-
pothetical action for a declaratory judgment on behalf of a desper-
ately situated patient.
The patient, Ernest Dyer, is in a health care institution where the
professionals have given advance notice of their intent to refuse to
honor his decision to refuse resuscitation, dialysis, mechanical venti-
8. U.S. Supreme Court to Hear First Right-to-Die Case, SocIETY FOR THE
RIGHT TO DIE NEWSLETTER, at 4 (Fall 1989).
9. See Pedrick, Arizona Tort Law and Dignified Death, 22 ARIZ. ST. L. 63, 65
nn. 8-9 (1990).
10. In February of 1990, a poll commissioned by Time/CNN reported that 80%
of people polled believe that doctors and families should be allowed to make the decision
to withdraw life support systems in hopeless situations. Gibbs, Love and Let Die, TIME,
March 19, 1990, at 62, 64.
11. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7185 (West 1970 & Supp. 1990).
12. Pedrick, supra note 9.
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lation or nutritional support. Dyer is suffering from Lou Gerhig's
disease, emphysema, and is a recent victim of a rather severe stroke.
The stroke left him with his mental facilities unimpaired, but he is
now paralyzed on his right side. He is attended by Doctor Resolute
and is presently in the NSD ("Never Say Die") Nursing Home.
Though presently competent, Dyer is very concerned that he may
become incompetent. Accordingly, he has given his doctor, Resolute,
a written instruction that he does not wish life sustaining procedures
to be used in his case. He has also executed a durable power of at-
torney naming his wife, Ernestina, as his agent for health care deci-
sions and has executed a "living will" under the California statute.
Despite Dyer's clear indication that he does not wish life-sustaining
systems used in his case, Dr. Resolute and the NSD Nursing Home
are committed to a philosophy of preserving life. Accordingly, they
have made plain to Dyer and his wife that they will, if placed in a
hopeless medical situation, use life-sustaining support systems.
Against this scenario, Dyer and his wife have instituted an action in
the California courts to secure a declaratory judgment answering
three questions. 3
Let us assume that our case, in due course, reaches the Supreme
Court of California. I offer now a completely unofficial and unautho-
rized judgment for the court in the case.
First of all, I shall blithely and blandly assume that it is a proper
case for a declaratory judgment. A health-care professional or insti-
tution that insists on moral grounds that life-sustaining procedures
be initiated and not discontinued ought to be findable as a defend-
ant. Indeed, a malpractice liability insurance company might very
well be interested in seeing such a case brought before the court.
The "Right to Die" cases in which the courts have gone ahead and
rendered judgment on the merits, notwithstanding the intervening
death of the patient-plaintiff,14 on the ground that the issues raised
are of great public importance, certainly support the view that a de-
claratory judgment action should lie in such a case.
The first question is whether the competent patient has the right
to forbid use, or to order withdrawal, of a life support system. That
right seems clearly established under California law. In company
13. To find California's Declaratory Judgment statute, see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 1060-1062.5 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991).
14. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 213 n.4, 741 P.2d 674, 681 n.4
(1987) (citing cases holding that the death of the plaintiff in right to die cases does not
render the case moot).
with virtually all other state court decisions on the subject, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal, in two decisions, has resoundingly endorsed
the doctrine of patient autonomy. As the appellate court stated in
Bouvia v. Superior Court in 1986,
A person of adult years and in sound mind has the right, in the exercise of
control over his own body, to determine whether or not to submit to medical
treatment. It follows that such a patient has the right to refuse any medical
treatment even that which may save or prolong her life."
That same sentiment was uttered in 1914 by Judge Cardozo, then on
the Court of Appeal for New York, and was quoted by the Califor-
nia court in its opinion in Bouvia.18
Elizabeth Bouvia, as you may recall, was a quadriplegic suffering
as well from cerebral palsy, confined to her bed, emaciated to the
point where at the time of the trial she weighed only sixty-five or
seventy pounds. Her lawsuit sought an injunction to remove the
nasogastric tube, at her request, through which nutrition and hydra-
tion were supplied to keep her alive. The Court of Appeal reversed
the lower court and ordered the health care institution in question to
disconnect, at her request, the tube for feeding and hydration.
Interestingly, last year, sixteen years after the trial, Ms. Bouvia
was reported as still surviving, with the tube still in place.17 Her
weight had increased to ninety pounds. But she, through her litiga-
tion, vindicated her right to control her own destiny regarding ac-
ceptance or refusal of medical treatment.
It is established in California, as in virtually all other states, that
health care givers are duty-bound under the common law of torts, as
well as perhaps, the right of privacy or liberty under state and fed-
eral constitutions, to follow instructions regarding use or nonuse of
life support systems from a competent patient, at least in the hope-
less situation.
The second question is: does it makes any difference whether the
patient gives the direction when he or she is competent, or whether a
surrogate decisionmaker gives it under a power of attorney for health
care decisions, or under a previously executed living will? Perhaps
we should start with the California version of the so-called "living
will." 8 I have examined this handiwork of the California legislature
and I can only say that it is awe-inspiring.
The statute was drafted with limitations that make it virtually
unusable. Commenting on the California Natural Death Act, the liv-
15. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297,
300 (1986).
16. See id. at 1139, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 302, (quoting Schloendoroff v. Society of
N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914), "[Elvery human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what should be done with his own body.")
17. L.A. Times, May 23, 1988, § 1, at 14, col. 2.
18. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West 1970 & Supp. 1991).
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ing will statute, the founder and director of the Santa Monica based
Hemlock Society said, "It was the first in the world but it was a
mess. It was savaged by opponents and it came out a dog's break-
fast."19 If the injury or illness has only produced a persistent vegeta-
tive state, as in the case of Nancy Cruzan, that condition, with the
aid of the life sustaining support system, may not be .regarded as
terminal.2" Further, a terminal condition must be certified by two
physicians. 2' Getting two physicians to agree on anything is probably
almost as difficult as getting two lawyers to agree. Moreover, a nurs-
ing home employee informed me that to get one doctor to come to a
nursing home is almost impossible. Worst of all, however, are the
provisions that imply that a "living will" under the California statute
will only be effective if it is executed after a diagnosis of a terminal
condition, and then only within a cooling off period of fourteen days
during which the document must be executed!22 Satisfying these con-
ditions would be comparable to winning the state lottery! Conse-
quently, the prospect is remote that we will ever know, from an ap-
pellate court decision in California, whether health care givers are
bound to respect and adhere to instructions on the subject of life
sustaining procedures in hopeless cases, as directed in a living will.
Fortunately, California, along with more than a dozen other
states, has a special statute authorizing execution of durable powers
19. Oliver, Right-to-Die Laws Take On New Life, L.A. Times, May 23, 1988, § 1,
1, at 14, col. 1.
20. On February 13, 1990, the American Bar Association approved the revised
Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act. UNI. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT
(1989), 9B U.L.A. 79 (Supp. 1989). In commenting on the definition of a "terminal
condition" in the act, the drafters observed that:
[T]he decision that death will occur at a relatively short time is to be made
without considering the possibilities of extending life with life-sustaining treat-
ment. The alternative is that required by a number of states-that death be
imminent whether or not life-sustaining procedures are applied. The President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
Research has noted that such a definition severely limits the group of termi-
nally ill patients able to qualify under these acts.
Id. § 1 Comment, 9B U.L.A. at 81-82 (Supp. 1991).
21. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187 (West 1970 & Supp. 1991).
22. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7188, 7191b (West 1970 & Supp.
1991) (implying that only after diagnosis of a terminally ill patient can an effective "liv-
ing will" be executed under the California law). See Comment, A Proposed Amendment
to the California Natural Death Act to Assume the Statutory Right to Control Life
Sustaining Treatment Decisions, 17 U.S.F. L. REv. 579 (1983) (recommending that the
California Natural Death Act be amended to dispense with the requirement that the
terminal condition had been diagnosed fourteen days priof to the execution of the "living
will").
of attorney for health care decisionmaking enacted in 1983,23 which
offers an opportunity which all should use.
One need not be in a terminal condition to appoint a proxy for
health care decisionmaking and the executed power is good for seven
years, subject to renewal. 24 In the best tradition of ambiguous drafts-
manship, there are conflicting currents concerning the nature of the
duty imposed on health care givers with respect to a surrogate
agent's instructions under a durable power. Thus, one section implies
that if there would be civil liability on the part of health care givers
who failed to follow instructions to withhold life sustaining systems
from a competent patient, then there would be similar liability with
respect to instructions to withhold life sustaining systems on the or-
der of the surrogate under the durable power.25 But another section
provides that there is no civil liability for failure to withdraw a life
sustaining system although it may constitute unprofessional conduct
if the health care giver fails to transfer the patient to another
professional.28
A 1988 decision of the Court of Appeal, taking the idea from Cal-
ifornia's living will statute, held that a physician who conscientiously
objects on moral grounds to disconnecting a life support system, can
escape liability by effecting a transfer of the patient to another
health care giver who will carry out the order. But speed in the
transfer process will surely be required if liability is to be avoided.
Nor is this a corner of the law where the doctrine of "all deliberate
speed" should have any function. Medical associations and nursing
home associations should compile lists of health care givers who will
let hopeless patients die in comfort and dignity.
The final question raised in the declaratory judgment proceeding
asks whether health care givers are subject to a claim for damages
from the patient's estate, or from the surviving family members, or
both, when instructions to withhold or withdraw life sustaining pro-
cedures are not followed.
Let us first consider the claim by the patient's estate (the claim
could, of course, be asserted by the patient, but in many of these
cases the patient dies before the slow-turning wheels of justice have
reached a conclusion). If the estate brings the action on behalf of a
23. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2430-2440 (West 1974 & Supp. 1991) (Durable Power of
Attorney for Health Care Decision Making).
24. Id. at § 2436.5.
25. Id. at § 2438.
26. Id. at § 2438(c).
27. Conservatorship of Morrison, 206 Cal. App. 3d 304, 311, 253 Cal. Rptr. 530,
534 (1988) (holding that a physician with moral scruples cannot be compelled to discon-
nect life support systems if transfer to an agreeable physician is feasible-with an impli-
cation that if such a transfer is not feasible, than the physician with scruples may never-
theless be ordered to disconnect).
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deceased patient, then we must give brief attention to the California
statute governing the survival of actions.28 Unlike some survival stat-
utes, the California act does not rule out actions for invasion of pri-
vacy (as is the case in Arizona and some other states) 9 but does, in
company with many other statutes, rule out any claim after the
death of the claimant for any damages for pain and suffering. 30 So,
as under the ancient common law, it may be cheaper to kill than to
maim. But the action for subjecting the patient to medical treatment
against his or her will does not depend on pain and suffering as an
element of damage.
An unauthorized, offensive touching of the patient has historically
been classed as a battery.3 1 For a battery, the injured party is enti-
tled, at minimum, to nominal damages and, as explained by Profes-
sor Dobbs in his treatise on Remedies, to so-called "general dam-
ages" 32 in an amount determined by the jury. The law presumes
general damage with respect to offensive touchings by the physician.
Moreover, the claim for unauthorized subjection to unwanted life
sustaining procedures may generate punitive damages as well. A
claim for punitive damages under the California Probate Code sur-
vives.33 The statutory provision with respect to punitive damages pro-
vides that oppression "means despicable conduct that subjects a per-
son to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that
person's rights. 3 4 For a dying patient to be subjected to a life sup-
port system against his or her will is both offensive and outrageous.
Surely this is one of the most horrific indignities to which a person
can be subjected.
An article in Law Medicine and Health Care published in 1985,
provides the following excerpt.
The eyewitness and long-term companion to the patient said:
When I came close to Brenda's bed I noticed they still didn't have an air
way. I said: 'I want this resuscitation stopped immediately! Miss Hewitt
doesn't want to be resuscitated! I'm legally authorized to make this decision
for her. I have here the original of her living will signed by her before
28. CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (West 1991).
29. Id. at § 573(c) (providing for survival of actions with no reference to privacy
claims).
30. Id. (expressly excluding survival of "damages for pain suffering, or
disfigurement").
31. W. PROSSER AND P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 9 (5th ed. 1984).
32. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGE-EQUITY- RESTI-
TUTION § 3.2, at 139 (1973).
33. CAL. PROB. CODE § 573(c) (West 1991) (specifically providing that "any pen-
alties or punitive or exemplary damages" are to survive).
34. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(c)(2) (West 1985 & Supp. 1990).
witnesses. I've also a notarized medical consent and authorization, signed
by her, for me to act on her behalf to consent to or withhold treatment.
Using that authority, I want this treatment stopped at once!' A few heads
looked up, but that was all. The chest thumping continued without interrup-
tion. Finally, a doctor urged me, 'We must discuss this matter outside.' He
gestured for me to follow him . . . Brenda was a heart-rending sight. A
couple of hoses were stuck into her mouth, presumably ending in a tracheal
tube. Her face was grotesquely distorted. There was a deep cut on the in-
side of her left thigh, and she was lying in a pool of pink arterial blood.31
Commenting on this horrendous account of Ms. Hewitt's death in a
New York hospital, the writer observed that, "[t]he hospital in
which this intentional degradation of what could have been a digni-
fied and peaceful death took place is not, unfortunately, unique
among teaching hospitals.""6
Whether the claim on behalf of the patient, now deceased, is
phrased as a battery or invasion of the right of privacy claim, the
law on the subject is surely shaped by the law of torts and specifi-
cally the law of battery. In a battery action, the amount of damages
awarded for both general and punitive damages is a matter that is
left to the jury. In California, when the jury is outraged at the de-
fendant's disregard of the legal rights of the injured party, the award
can be substantial indeed.
It is my thesis that when health care givers subject a competent
patient to life sustaining procedures against his or her will, the set-
tled law of torts provides a remedy by way of an action for battery,
with resultant liability on the part of the health care givers for sub-
stantial damages, both general and punitive. One or two cases in
other jurisdictions37 already sustain this quite conventional ground of
liability.
When the instructions come from a surrogate agent under a dura-
ble power of attorney for health care decisionmaking, the answer
may not be the same. In 1986, a California Court of Appeal decision
declined to impose liability on an intentional or reckless infliction of
mental suffering theory. The court reasoned that the health care
giver's refusal to follow instructions contained in a living will, a writ-
ten declaration, and under a durable power of attorney with instruc-
tions, was not outrageous in light of the unsettled state of the law at
that time. 8 There was no discussion of the battery theory of
liability.
35. Schucking, Death at a New York Hospital, 13 Law, Med. & Health Care 261,
263 (1985).
36. Annas, Into the Hands of Strangers, 13 Law, Med. & Health Care 271
(1985).
37. Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984).
See Miller, Right-to-Die Damage Actions: Developments in the Law, 65 DEN. U.L. REv.
181 (1988).
38. Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Med. Center, 184 Cal. App. 3d 961, 970-71,
229 Cal. Rptr. 360, 364-65 (1986).
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A 1989 California Court of Appeal decision seems to hold that the
claimant, surviving wife, had no claim for intentional or reckless in-
fliction of mental suffering because she did not seek to have the phy-
sician attempt to transfer the patient to a more agreeable care
giver.39
As the emerging state of the law now stands, the prospect of suc-
ceeding in a battery action, where the medical situation is hopeless
and recognized as such by the attending physician, depends on
whether the physician insists on continuing to serve the expiring pa-
tient while maintaining the patient on life support systems contrary
to the surrogate's order, making no effort to have the patient trans-
ferred to another physician and another health care facility. If the
health care giver declines, on moral grounds, to respect an order to
disconnect and does not take immediate steps to transfer the patient,
the physician should be liable for general and punitive damages.
The last question is whether the surviving family members may
assert their own claim against the health care givers for intentional
or reckless infliction of mental suffering due to the physician's re-
fusal to honor the patient's, or the surrogate agent's order to with-
hold or withdraw life support systems. As I stated, a 1986 Court of
Appeal decision40 took the position that an intentional.or reckless
infliction of mental suffering action would not lie against health care
givers who refuse to take orders to disconnect. The law on the "right
to die" at that time had not been adequately developed in California.
Under those circumstances, the Court of Appeal could not see the
health care givers' good faith refusal, on moral grounds, to follow
orders to disconnect, as rising to the level of "outrageous" conduct.
But since that 1986 decision, the law of California on the subject
of patient autonomy has developed. Currently, the caregiver who de-
fies the competent patient's or his or her agent's instructions as to
the non-use of life sustaining procedures is not merely negligent.
Such a caregiver is chargeable with conscious intentional wrongdo-
ing. For the family, the appropriate theory of legal liability in such a
case is for reckless infliction of mental suffering. Moreover, the
health care giver is probably in communication with the patient's
near relatives and is aware of their special sensitivity. Consequently,
liability for the immediate family members' pain and suffering is
probable.
39. Westhart v. Mule, 261 Cal. Rptr. 640, 644-45 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1989) (not
officially published).
40. Id.
Cases of solely negligent conduct concerning the handling of dead
bodies have imposed liability because the defendant knew the emo-
tions of the family members would be seriously affected by a breach
of duty.4 In such cases of a breach of duty toward family members
known to be in an emotionally vulnerable state, the Restatement of
Torts requirement that the resulting distress be severe has not been
too rigorously applied.42
The conclusion is that the health care giver who refuses to respect
the competent patient's instruction, or the surrogate agent's instruc-
tion, regarding life sustaining procedures when the situation is hope-
less and. does not speedily undertake to effect a transfer of the pa-
tient, may well be subject to liability to close family members for
intentional or reckless infliction of mental suffering and for punitive
damages as well.
In the early development of the law on the subject of the "right to
die," health care givers were concerned that they might (1) be sub-
ject to legal sanction, (2) be liable for wrongful death, or (3) crimi-
nally indicted for murder if they failed to utilize every technologi-
cally possible method to sustain their patient's life. Those fears are
now without foundation.4"
My object in these remarks has been to demonstrate to the medi-
cal and legal professions of California, if that be needed, that there
are now very real risks of legal liability if physicians and health care
institutions decline to follow a competent patient's instruction on the
nonuse of life sustaining procedures in hopeless situations. Further-
more, there may be risks of legal liability if they defy the surrogate
agent's instruction without at once undertaking to transfer the pa-
tient to other agreeable health care givers. Thus, the sanction of gen-
eral and punitive damages, administered under well settled principles
of the common law of torts, should have a salutary effect on the
conduct of a minority of health care givers whose personal scruples
have impaired their ability to recognize the primacy of the patient's
authority in hopeless situations. This is one sanction.
Perhaps an even more effective sanction to vindicate patient au-
tonomy is to refuse to pay for life support systems supplied in defi-
ance of the patient's instructions or the instructions of his or her
41. See W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 31 § 54 (5th ed. 1984).
42. See Pedrick, Intentional Infliction: Should Section 46 be Revised?, 13 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 1 (1985).
43. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983)
(physician charged with murder for removing the ventilator and nutritional support and
hydration at the family's request-the California Court of Appeals sustained the trial
court's dismissal of the murder charges). See also In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405
N.E.2d 115 (1980). (The "living will statutes," now in effect in at least forty states,
specifically provide that there shall be no civil liability for following the living will's in-
struction that life support systems not be used in hopeless situations.
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surrogate agent. I am not a contracts scholar, but I suggest families
would be well advised to not pay for medical services that were
countermanded.
The press for March 19, 1990,44 reports on a suit brought by Ed-
ward Winter, as plaintiff, against a hospital in Cincinnati that re-
vived him at age eighty-two through electric shock, despite his claim
that he had given instructions that CPR (cardiac pulmonary resusci-
tation) was not to be used in his case. Since revived, he has suffered
strokes and though alive, he is partially paralyzed, bedridden in a
nursing home, and seriously depressed-some life! I should think
that under the law, he may well have an enforceable claim, although
the question of how much damage should be awarded may present
some hard questions. Nevertheless, he certainly ought not to be
chargeable for medical expenses incurred after being subjected to
unwanted medical procedures.
I suggest also, that Medicare and health insurance carriers should
routinely inquire whether the health care giver had received instruc-
tions declining use of life support systems prior to a patient's death.
In such cases, payment for medical services rendered after knowl-
edge of the prohibition order ought to be refused. Such a policy
adopted by Medicare, Medicaid, and the health insurance industry
would, I believe, have a salutary effect in bringing an effective sanc-
tion to bear on health care givers, and through fiscal persuasion,
should bring them to honor the instructions of patients and surrogate
agents on this subject.
There are, of course, many interesting matters on which I have not
commented. The Bar Association and the Medical Association in
San Diego have issued a detailed procedure to be followed to assure
death with dignity for those who have given the proper
instructions.45
Despite the best efforts of the legal and medical professions, how-
ever, there will probably continue to be vast numbers of persons who
do not give advance thought to whether life support systems are to
be employed when they come to the last mile. For such devil-may-
care folks, the law must somehow provide an answer as to how the
issue of the use and continuation of life support systems is to be
44. L.A. Times, Mar. 19, 1990, Overseas News Section, at 3; N.Y. Times, Apr.
17, 1990, Late Edition-Final, at B12, col. 1 (report that Mr. Winter died on Saturday,
April 15, 1990).
45. L.A. Tim6s, June 9, 1989, § 1, at 34, col. I (article by Jane Fritsch, describing
the guidelines adopted by the San Diego County Bar Association and the County's Medi-
cal Society on termination of life-prolonging measures).
resolved. Fortunately, it is reasonably clear at this stage, in states
other than Missouri, that if the family and the physicians agree,
then it is proper, without a court proceeding, to terminate the life
support system. Where there is disagreement, resort to a court pro-
ceeding through appointment of a guardian may well be required.
Perhaps the legislature should prescribe procedures to be followed in
such cases. There is now, as of August 1989, a revised Uniform Act
on Rights of the Terminally I1.46 For thoughtless persons who die
without wills, there is a state mandated system of intestate succes-
sion to property. But the issues raised in connection with the hard
"right-to-die" cases are difficult and generate fierce emotional re-
sponses. The draft Uniform Act on the Rights of the Terminally Ill
looks promising.
It is remarkable that these modern technological marvels which
serve to hold death at bay, while the patient lives on in a vegetative
state, generate legal questions for which some of the answers are to
be found in the ancient common law of torts. But, the common law,
as we know, is uncommonly creative and adaptable. Even without
legislative assistance, it may help make death more tolerable in this
technological age.
46. UNF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL AcT (1989), 9B U.L.A. 79 (Supp.
1991) (approved by the Annual Conference, August 4, 1989 and approved by the Ameri-
can Bar Association, February 13, 1990). In its original 1985 version (9B U.L.A. 604
(1987)), the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act suffered from three serious defi-
ciencies. Chapman, The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act: Too Little, Too
Late?, 42 ARK L. REV. 319, (1989). Those deficiencies she pointed to were (1) absence of
any provision for appointment of a proxy agent to make health care decisions; (2) the
need for some provision to encompass the case of the permanently unconscious but not
terminally ill patient; (3) the need for provision of some process for making the health
care decision for the patient in extremis where no advance directive or appointment of a
proxy has been made. Id. at 391-93. The 1989 revision of the Uniform Rights of the
Terminally Ill Act meets these criticisms by providing for a proxy agent to make health
care decisions when the patient is in extremis and provides that when the patient has
neither given instructions nor appointed a proxy, the family may authorize withdrawal of
life sustaining systems. The revised draft Uniform Act does not address the case of the
patient who is unconscious without hope of recovery but is not in a terminal state. The
Draft Act specifically disavows any entry into the euthanasia field.
